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Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride 
Circuit Again 
David R. Stras† 
“[W]e shall have these gentlemen as judges of the Supreme 
Court . . . not mingling with the ordinary transactions of busi-
ness—not accustomed to the ‘forensic strepitus’ in the courts be-
low—not seeing the rules of evidence practically applied to the 
cases before them—not enlightened upon the laws of the several 
States, which they have finally to administer here, by the dis-
cussion of able and learned counsel in the courts below—not 
seen by the people of the United States—not known and recog-
nized by them—not touching them as it were in the administra-
tion of their high office—not felt, and understood, and realized 
as part and parcel of this great popular Government; but sitting 
here alone—becoming philosophical and speculative in their in-
quires as to law—becoming necessarily more and more dim as 
to the nature of the law of the various States, from want of fa-
miliar and daily connection with them—unseen, final arbiters 
of justice, issuing their decrees as it were from a secret cham-
ber—moving invisibly amongst us, as far as the whole commu-
nity is concerned; and, in my judgment, losing in fact the ability 
to discharge their duties as well as that responsive confidence of 
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
is grateful to Arthur Hellman, Toby Heytens, Tim Johnson, Heidi Kitrosser 
and Ryan Scott for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. This 
Article also benefited from the excellent research assistance provided by Dan 
Ellerbrock, Ivan Ludmer, and Shaun Pettigrew. I would also like to specially 
thank Karla Vehrs, with whom I first discussed this topic two years ago and 
who urged me to write this Article despite my decision to write on a different 
topic one year ago for the Minnesota Law Review Symposium. In addition, I 
would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Editorial Board of Volume 91 
of the Minnesota Law Review for providing me with a forum for this Article, 
and for selecting me as their faculty advisor. I note that this Article was ac-
cepted for publication prior to my appointment as faculty advisor. Copyright 
© 2007 by David R. Stras. 
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the people, which adds so essentially to the sanction of all acts of 
the officers of Government.”1 
 
Supreme Court Justices have not “ridden circuit”2 for ap-
proximately one hundred years,3 but the admonition of Senator 
George Badger rings as true today as it did when Congress con-
sidered eliminating circuit riding in 1848. Today’s Justices 
spend roughly nine months a year cloistered in the Supreme 
Court building in Washington, D.C., making decisions and issu-
ing opinions on some of the most important issues of the day.4 
Many people are unfamiliar with how the Court makes deci-
sions, its relationship to the other branches of government, or 
even what types of cases it hears. Indeed, the vast majority of 
Americans cannot even name a single Supreme Court Justice.5 
As several commentators have noted, the Supreme Court is ar-
guably the most remote and secretive branch of government, at 
least insofar as its internal deliberations are concerned.6 Yet 
that was not always the case. 
To the contrary, the earliest Justices spent most of their 
time outside of Washington, D.C., serving as judges of the cir-
cuit courts and conversing with lawyers and citizens.7 Although 
 
 1. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 596 (1848) (statement of Senator 
George Badger regarding a bill that would have ended the practice of circuit 
riding). 
 2. In this Article, I use the words “ride circuit,” “circuit riding,” “circuit 
duties,” and other similar terms interchangeably to refer to the circuit duties 
of Justices. 
 3. See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the 
History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1829 (2003). Glick’s Com-
ment, which is a wonderful and thorough discussion of the history of circuit 
riding, provided me with a valuable starting point and bibliography for my re-
search. 
 4. See The Supreme Court, Not Ducking, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2004, at 
30, 30. 
 5. See James Bovard, Ignorance Puts Our Freedom at Risk: Uninformed 
and Uninterested, Americans Make It Easy for Leaders to Grab More Power, 
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 24, 2006, at 25; Greg Pierce, Insider Poli-
tics: Court Polls, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A6 (citing a Findlaw poll that 
found that “nearly two-thirds of Americans couldn’t name a single current 
U.S. Supreme Court justice”). 
 6. See Matthew D. Bunker, Supreme Court Justices Recoil at Being Stars 
of Reality TV, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, April 6, 2003, at C4; Inside the Court, N.J. 
REC., Mar. 8, 2004, at L6. 
 7. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks 
(Oct. 6, 2000), in 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2002). In fact, during the 
first two Terms, there were no cases on the Supreme Court’s docket and the 
duties of the Justices consisted only of riding circuit. See Glick, supra note 3, 
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circuit riding was burdensome and even dangerous in light of 
the difficult travel conditions during the formative years of the 
nation,8 it led to a “relationship of camaraderie and respect” be-
tween the Justices and local citizens, judges, and members of 
the bar.9 The accessibility of the Justices to the general public 
was one of the chief reasons why circuit riding was not formally 
abolished until 1911,10 despite repeated attempts by some 
members of Congress and the Court to eliminate it.11 
This Article demonstrates that many of the arguments fa-
voring circuit riding during this nation’s early years are equally 
apt today. Circuit riding was important because it exposed Jus-
tices to life outside of Washington and brought them closer to 
the general citizenry. A modern form of circuit riding would en-
sure that Justices gain exposure to a wider array of legal is-
sues, the laws of various states, and the difficulties faced by 
lower courts in implementing the Court’s sweeping (and some-
times confounding) rulings. A renewal of circuit riding would 
confer additional, new benefits as well: empirical evidence 
tends to show that increasing the workload of the Justices 
would encourage them to retire in a timely manner, prior to the 
onset of mental or physical infirmity.12 
On the other hand, many of the arguments against circuit 
riding, including the crushing caseload faced by the Court fol-
lowing the Civil War,13 are no longer barriers for the modern 
 
at 1764. 
 8. Many of the early Justices traveled from Washington, D.C. to the cir-
cuit courts by means of a stick gig, which was “a wooden chair supported on 
two wheels and two shafts and pulled by one horse.” See Leonard Baker, The 
Circuit Riding Justices, 1977 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 63, 63. 
 9. Id. at 67. 
 10. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1799, 1800, 1809, 1829. The Judiciary Act 
of 1801, popularly known as the “Midnight Judges Act,” briefly eliminated cir-
cuit riding. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed by 
Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132). Less than one year later, however, the 
Jeffersonian Republicans, who by then controlled both houses of Congress, re-
pealed the Midnight Judges Act and reestablished circuit riding. See Act of 
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. 
 11. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1799, 1804–05, 1807–09. 
 12. See David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1435–37 (2006); see also David R. Stras & Ryan W. 
Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1397, 1455–59 (2005) (proposing a “Golden Parachute” for Supreme Court 
Justices in order to encourage them to retire before becoming mentally or 
physically infirm). 
 13. The number of signed opinions issued by the Supreme Court rapidly 
expanded from 128 in 1866 to 298 by 1887. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME 
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Court. The elimination of the Supreme Court’s mandatory ap-
pellate jurisdiction in 1988 has granted the Court broad—
indeed nearly unlimited—discretion in deciding what cases de-
serve plenary review.14 Following the passage of that law, the 
plenary docket has decreased from 141 signed opinions in 1988 
to just seventy-four signed opinions during October Term 2003, 
which is the lowest output for the Court since 1865.15 Besides 
the Court’s shrinking docket, the country’s modern transporta-
tion system means that Justices no longer face the danger and 
delay accompanying transcontinental travel. 
Part I describes the storied history of circuit riding, with 
particular emphasis on its advantages and disadvantages. It 
tracks circuit riding from its creation in the Judiciary Act of 
1789 through its abolition in the Judicial Code of 1911.16 An 
examination of its history, and specifically its advantages and 
drawbacks, is essential to determining whether circuit riding 
should be revived today. 
Part II begins by arguing that none of the policy objections 
that led to the abandonment of circuit riding are germane to-
day. Focusing on the historical advantages of circuit riding, 
Part II further explains that a modern form of circuit riding 
would incorporate many of the advantages envisioned and dis-
cussed by the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Part II then 
proposes the first modern circuit riding statute, The Circuit 
Riding Act of 2007, which would require Justices to spend ap-
proximately five days per year hearing oral arguments with a 
panel of one or more of the U.S. courts of appeals. After setting 
forth the proposed statute, Part II evaluates and compares it 
with the circuit riding plan recently proposed by Professor Ste-
ven Calabresi and David Presser, which would require Justices 
to spend four weeks per year performing the work of federal 
district court judges.17 While interesting, Calabresi and 
Presser’s plan is neither practical nor tailored to the strengths 
and competencies of the Justices. Instead, a plan such as the 
Circuit Riding Act of 2007, which requires the Justices to serve 
as appellate judges, encompasses neither of those drawbacks 
 
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 232–36 tbl.3-3 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 14. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. 
 15. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–35 tbl.3-3. 
 16. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. 
 17. See Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit 
Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388–89 (2006). 
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and shares many, if not all, of the advantages of Calabresi and 
Presser’s proposal. Finally, Part II addresses the policy and 
constitutional objections to the Circuit Riding Act of 2007. 
I.  THE STORIED HISTORY OF CIRCUIT RIDING   
A. THE BIRTH OF CIRCUIT RIDING 
The formidable task of creating a national judiciary was 
left to the nation’s First Congress, which in 1789 enacted the 
first Judiciary Act.18 That Act established a Supreme Court 
composed of six Justices,19 three circuit courts,20 and thirteen 
district courts.21 In contrast to the district courts, which were 
solely courts of first instance,22 the circuit courts exercised the 
functions of both a trial23 and an appellate24 court. The Judici-
ary Act of 1789, moreover, created three judicial circuits: the 
eastern, middle, and southern circuits.25 While Congress cre-
 
 18. WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 3 (1990). 
 19. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73. 
 20. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. 
 21. See id. §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. at 73. 
 22. See, e.g., id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (assigning district courts jurisdiction 
over federal criminal prosecutions where the punishment did not exceed thirty 
lashes, one hundred dollars, or six months imprisonment); id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77 
(giving district courts jurisdiction over all suits “against consuls or vice con-
suls”); id. (granting jurisdiction to the district courts over “all suits at the com-
mon law where the United States sue[s]” and the matter in dispute exceeds 
one hundred dollars). 
 23. See, e.g., id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (assigning the circuit courts concur-
rent jurisdiction over criminal matters within the district court’s jurisdiction 
and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes); id. at 78 (granting cir-
cuit courts jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in 
equity,” where “an alien is a party, or the suit is between the citizen of the 
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state”). 
 24. See, e.g., id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 83 (giving appellate jurisdiction to circuit 
courts in “causes of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in 
dispute exceeds the sum or value of three hundred dollars”); id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 
84 (permitting a “writ of error” from the district courts in civil actions exceed-
ing “the sum or value of fifty dollars”). 
 25. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. The states of Maine and Kentucky were 
not included in the original circuit court system, and instead the district 
courts in each of those states exercised the jurisdiction, “except of appeals and 
writs of error,” of both the district and circuit courts. See id. § 10, 1 Stat. at 
77–78. Decisions of the Kentucky district court could be appealed to the Su-
preme Court in cases where the amount in controversy exceeded two thousand 
dollars, see id. §§ 10, 22, 1 Stat. at 77–78, 84–85, and decisions of the Maine 
district court could be appealed to the circuit court for Massachusetts, see id. 
§ 10, 1 Stat. at 78. 
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ated one district judgeship for the district court in each state,26 
it did not establish separate circuit judgeships to staff the cir-
cuit courts. Instead, each three-judge circuit court included one 
local district judge and two Supreme Court Justices.27 The Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, therefore, required Justices to ride circuit, 
which involved traveling from state to state in order to hold cir-
cuit court in each district within a circuit twice annually.28 
Perhaps the primary reason for the creation of the circuit 
court system was its low cost, as compared to establishing a 
separate tier of appellate judges to staff an intermediate appel-
late court.29 By using Supreme Court Justices and district 
judges to hold circuit court, the First Congress avoided the ex-
pense associated with adding another set of circuit court judges 
to the nation’s payroll, which many perceived as too inflated al-
ready.30 In addition, the circuit courts reduced the substantial 
costs involved for litigants who otherwise would have been re-
quired to appeal a district court’s judgment to a geographically 
distant Supreme Court.31 Accordingly, the circuit courts con-
served substantial resources for both the newly formed gov-
ernment and litigants appearing before the federal courts, an 
advantage that appealed to both the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists.32 
 
 26. See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73. 
 27. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. A quorum of two judges of the circuit 
court was sufficient to conduct business. Id. However, in any case in which the 
circuit court was sitting in appellate review of a decision of the district court, 
the district judge could not vote on the appeal but could “assign the reasons” 
for his decision. Id. 
 28. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. 
 29. See Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear 
Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Cir-
cuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 306 
(1987). 
 30. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 130 (“It is plausible, even likely, that nothing more 
lies behind this feature of the judicial system than a close-fisted Connecticut 
concern to get value for money.”). 
 31. See Holt, supra note 29, at 306; William Paterson’s Notes on the Judi-
ciary Bill Debate and Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill (June 22–23, 1789), 
reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 410, 410–
13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (noting that circuit court judges would meet 
“every citizen in his own State” and “carry Law to [citizen’s] [h]omes, to their 
very [d]oors”). 
 32. See Holt, supra note 29, at 306 n.18 (discussing Federalist and Anti-
Federalist sentiments on the expenses associated with a national judiciary). 
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As the country grew larger and wealthier, the costs of staff-
ing an additional layer of courts became less of a concern. In 
contrast, one factor that was repeatedly mentioned during ini-
tial debates about circuit riding, and then throughout discus-
sions about its possible abolition in the nineteenth century, was 
the value of exposing Justices to viewpoints, customs, and laws 
outside of Washington, D.C.33 Circuit riding fostered Justices’ 
familiarity with the local issues facing citizens and members of 
the bar throughout the country.34 It also ensured that the Jus-
tices remained connected to the laws of a number of states, 
which was essential for both conducting the circuit courts and 
for Supreme Court review of claims involving state law.35 In 
addition to enhancing familiarity with local laws, circuit court 
responsibilities kept the Justices aware of significant state 
court rulings that the Court could be called upon to review un-
der the Judiciary Act of 1789.36 
Circuit riding also provided a unique opportunity for the 
education and persuasion of local citizens about the benefits 
and responsibilities of the new constitutional system.37 It put 
Justices directly in contact with local citizens, judges, and 
members of the bar, and the camaraderie that developed per-
mitted the Justices to serve as distinguished representatives of 
the new federal government.38 In fact, while on circuit, the Jus-
tices delivered grand jury charges, which were widely reprinted 
 
 33. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1785, 1799–1800, 1804 n.374, 1809 & 
n.404, 1816 & n.456 (recounting various debates about circuit riding). During 
its inaugural Term, the Supreme Court met in the Royal Exchange Building in 
New York City. See ROBERT J. WAGMAN, THE SUPREME COURT: A CITIZEN’S 
GUIDE 41 (1993). 
 34. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
 35. See William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (discussing Blunt’s Lessee v. Smith, 20 U.S. (7 
Wheat.) 248 (1822), in which the Supreme Court decided whether the lower 
court had properly instructed the jury under North Carolina and Tennessee 
law). 
 36. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress authorized a writ of error to the 
Supreme Court from a decision of the highest court of a state in which a deci-
sion could be had in three circumstances: (1) where a federal statute, treaty, or 
authority was found invalid; (2) where a state statute or authority was upheld 
against a challenge based on the Constitution, federal statute, or treaty; and 
(3) where a federal title, right, privilege, or exemption was specifically claimed 
or set up and then denied. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87. 
 37. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 19 (1928); Holt, 
supra note 29, at 307–08. 
 38. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1759–60. 
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in newspapers, to lecture citizens “on the nature of centralized 
government, the responsibility of the citizenry, and the ways in 
which the new government served their needs.”39 Local citizens 
enjoyed watching the Justices perform their circuit duties, pro-
viding a positive impression of the newly created federal 
courts.40 
Another advantage of circuit riding was its important con-
tribution to the administration of justice in the new federal 
court system. As opposed to the district courts, the jurisdiction 
of the circuit courts was wide ranging41 and involved some of 
the most important cases and divisive legal questions facing 
the new Republic.42 By ensuring that one or more Justices par-
ticipated in the resolution of each case before the circuit courts, 
circuit riding improved public confidence in the outcome of in-
dividual cases and in the legitimacy of the circuit courts more 
generally.43 
Finally, circuit riding enhanced the uniformity of federal 
law,44 which was an important consideration in light of the na-
tion’s less than satisfactory experience under the Articles of 
Confederation. Such uniformity was especially imperative in 
the maritime field, where the “need for a body of law applicable 
throughout the nation was recognized” as essential to effective 
commerce.45 By involving Justices in the decisions made by the 
circuit courts, local pressures rarely carried the day,46 and uni-
form outcomes among the district courts were more common 
because of the Justices’ recurring contact with local district 
judges.47 
 
 39. Id. at 1760. 
 40. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8, at 67 (discussing the positive impression 
left by Chief Justice Marshall’s appearance in the circuit court of Richmond, 
Virginia). 
 41. See Holt, supra note 29, at 305–06. 
 42. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT 
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 29 (2003); Holt, supra note 29, at 
307. 
 43. See Holt, supra note 29, at 307. 
 44. Id. at 308. 
 45. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 7. 
 46. It is not the case that local pressures never unduly influenced the de-
cisions of the circuit courts. Leonard Baker recounts one instance in which a 
circuit court decision involving Justice Story ruled against a ban on imports 
from Great Britain based on “‘New England antiwar sentiment.’” Baker, supra 
note 8, at 67 (quoting GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY & THE RISE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT 97 (1970)). 
 47. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1761. 
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B. THE BURDENS OF CIRCUIT RIDING AND ITS TEMPORARY 
ABOLITION 
Despite the high hopes and good intentions of the First 
Congress, circuit riding was difficult in light of the means of 
transportation available in the late 1700s. For the Justices, it 
meant “bouncing thousands of miles over rutted, dirt roads in 
stagecoach, on horseback, and in stick gigs to bring the federal 
judiciary system to the American communities strewn along 
the Eastern seaboard.”48 The task was even more burdensome, 
and even dangerous, for Justices riding through the southern 
circuit, which “required long trips through rough, unpopulated, 
and even unknown terrain at times in unpredictably nasty 
weather with lodging uncertain and often unpleasant.”49 The 
Justices assigned to the southern circuit had to travel nearly 
two thousand miles a year under these conditions,50 and it of-
ten took six months or more for them to complete their circuit 
duties.51 To make matters worse, the Justices were forced to 
pay for their own travel and lodging while on the road.52 
To say that most Justices disliked circuit riding would be 
an understatement. Between 1789 and 1799, two Supreme 
Court Justices (Justice Johnson and Justice Blair) resigned 
their positions due to the difficulties associated with circuit rid-
ing, while two others (Chief Justice Jay and Justice Rutledge) 
left to pursue positions in state government.53 Robert Harrison, 
meanwhile, declined an appointment to the Supreme Court be-
cause he found the duties of a Justice “extremely difficult [and] 
burthensome [sic]” as it could result in the “loss of [his] health, 
and sacrifice [of] a very large portion of [his] private and do-
mestic happiness.”54 Other Justices, such as James Iredell, 
 
 48. Baker, supra note 8, at 63. 
 49. Glick, supra note 3, at 1765 (internal quotation marks and footnotes 
omitted). Indeed, it was not unusual for the Justices to share a room with 
complete strangers; Justice Cushing once slept with twelve fellow lodgers, and 
Justice Iredell unexpectedly discovered “a bed fellow of the wrong sort” on an-
other trip. See id. at 1765 n.79 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIR-
CUIT 1790–1794, at 3 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)). 
 50. See Holt, supra note 29, at 309. 
 51. Glick, supra note 3, at 1766. 
 52. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 559 n.29 (1971). 
 53. Glick, supra note 3, at 1780 n.207. 
 54. Letter from Robert H. Harrison, Chief Justice of the Gen. Court of 
Md., to George Washington, U.S. President (Oct. 27, 1789), reprinted in 1 THE 
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were pushed into ill health and even death due in part to the 
rigors of circuit riding.55 By all accounts, circuit riding was a 
truly miserable part of the job. 
Those who remained on the Court complained vigorously 
about their circuit duties. Besides writing each other,56 the Jus-
tices began corresponding with various political leaders to gar-
ner support for the elimination of circuit riding.57 Writing 
President Washington, the Justices stated that they found “the 
burdens laid upon [them] so excessive that” they could not keep 
from “representing them in strong and explicit terms.”58 Attor-
ney General Edmund Randolph agreed with the Justices and 
proposed the abolition of circuit riding, but a congressional 
committee ignored his recommendation.59 As the Justices be-
came increasingly desperate to rid themselves of the burdens of 
circuit riding, they offered to forfeit part of their salary in ex-
change for the elimination of their circuit duties.60 Congress 
eventually granted the Justices partial relief in 1793 when it 
passed a law requiring only one Justice to attend each circuit 
court,61 but it rejected other efforts by the Justices to make cir-
cuit riding less burdensome.62 
After the Justices had been riding circuit for more than a 
decade, the outgoing Federalist Congress temporarily abolished 
the practice in 1801. Shortly after losing the presidential and 
congressional elections to the Republicans, but prior to the 
transfer of power, the Federalists passed the Judiciary Act of 
1801,63 otherwise known as the “Midnight Judges Act.” The Act 
abolished circuit riding, reduced the number of Justices on the 
 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789–1800: APPOINTMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS 36, 36–37 (Maeva Marcus & 
James R. Perry eds., 1985). 
 55. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1391. 
 56. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 29, at 309 n.28 (quoting Letter from James 
Iredell, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thomas Johnson, Assoc. Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1792)). 
 57. See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF 
EARLY JUDGES 103 (1997). 
 58. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 22. 
 59. Glick, supra note 3, at 1768–69. 
 60. Id. at 1769–70. 
 61. Judiciary Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333. 
 62. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1778. The Justices attempted to alter the 
sequence and timing of riding circuit in order to make it less burdensome. Id. 
Although Congress partially acquiesced to the Justices’ recommended actions, 
it refused to reform the middle circuit. 
 63. Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. 
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Supreme Court from six to five, and created six new circuit 
courts staffed with sixteen new circuit judges.64 The Act gained 
its popular name because President Adams nominated Federal-
ist politicians to fill the new positions on the circuit courts, and 
many of them received their commissions on Adams’s last day 
in office.65 The passage of the Act and the confirmation of the 
new judges caused dissension around the country; Republican 
newspapers savagely criticized the Federalists’ actions.66 De-
spite a vigorous debate about the benefits of eliminating circuit 
riding,67 the Republicans repealed the entirety of the Judiciary 
Act of 1801 less than one year after it was enacted.68 
The repeal of the Midnight Judges Act eventually led to a 
constitutional showdown before the Supreme Court when a liti-
gant challenged Chief Justice Marshall’s power to serve as a 
circuit judge in Stuart v. Laird.69 After Marshall upheld the 
Repeal Act while sitting as a circuit judge, the case reached the 
Supreme Court. Former Attorney General Charles Lee, who 
argued the case before the Supreme Court, offered four chief 
arguments against the Repeal Act. First, he argued that circuit 
riding was unconstitutional because it required Justices to hear 
the trial of cases that were outside of the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court.70 Second, he contended that circuit riding 
violated the Appointments Clause because it “impose[d] new 
duties” on the Justices, and the addition of these new duties 
was inconsistent with their appointment as Supreme Court 
Justices.71 Third, he maintained that circuit riding violated a 
litigant’s right to have six unbiased Justices decide a case be-
fore the Supreme Court.72 Finally, he asserted that the Repeal 
Act was unconstitutional because it deprived the newly ap-
pointed circuit judges of life tenure, in contravention of Article 
 
 64. Id. §§ 6–7, 2 Stat. at 90–91 (repealed 1802). 
 65. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIS-
TORY 188 (1926). 
 66. Id. One common criticism was that “Adams [wa]s laying the founda-
tion of future faction and his own shame.” Id. 
 67. See Michael Coblenz, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, 
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy, FED. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 49, 
50 (book review). 
 68. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. 
 69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 70. See id. at 305. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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III, Section 1 of the Constitution.73 
The Court disposed of the first three arguments (ignoring 
the fourth) in all of 119 words, noting that any constitutional 
objection to circuit riding was “of recent date” and that “prac-
tice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, 
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, af-
fords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construc-
tion.”74 The decision in the case was no doubt influenced by the 
political environment at the time, as the Republicans had con-
trol of both the executive and legislative branches.75 In uphold-
ing the Repeal Act, the Court was able to avoid a bitter show-
down with Jefferson.76 
C. THE INCREASING BURDENS OF CIRCUIT RIDING AND ITS 
ABOLITION 
The westward expansion of the United States meant longer 
and even more difficult circuit riding trips for the Justices over 
rough terrain.77 In 1807, Congress established the Seventh Cir-
cuit and added a seventh Supreme Court Justice to staff it.78 In 
1837, eight more states were added to the circuit system and 
two additional Justices were appointed to sit in the newly cre-
ated Eighth and Ninth Circuits.79 When Justice Stephen Field 
was appointed to the Court in 1863, he was assigned circuit du-
ties for the new Tenth circuit, a trip that took him approxi-
mately six weeks to complete.80 Many of the Justices were re-
 
 73. Id. at 303–04. 
 74. Id. at 309. I have previously stated that, though Stuart was “abys-
mally reasoned,” the Court was correct in upholding circuit riding against con-
stitutional challenge. See Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1408. 
 75. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEF-
FERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 195–98 
(2005) (suggesting that the outcome of Stuart was based more on a fear of the 
Republicans than on a consensus that circuit riding was constitutional). 
 76. See Coblenz, supra note 67, at 51. 
 77. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and 
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 
IND. L.J. 153, 172 (2003). 
 78. Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420; Geyh, supra note 77, at 172. 
 79. See Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176. 
 80. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1813 & n.437. Justice Stephen Field was 
nearly assassinated while riding circuit. David Terry, his former colleague on 
the California Supreme Court and a losing litigant before Field’s circuit court, 
attempted to kill Justice Field while he was dining on a train. See In re Nea-
gle, 135 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1890); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Su-
preme Court, Remarks at the Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms 
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quired to travel more than two thousand miles annually,81 and 
their journeys remained hazardous. The roads were often in-
adequate for their carriages,82 sickness and disease were con-
stant worries,83 and the accommodations were still uncomfort-
able in many areas.84 
In addition to the growing burdens presented by the travel, 
the Justices faced a burgeoning docket. The country’s expan-
sion meant an increase in the amount of judicial business, be-
fore both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.85 The num-
ber of cases before the Supreme Court nearly doubled from 
1803 to 1810,86 and by 1826 the Court was able to dispose of 
only thirty-eight out of the 164 docketed cases.87 By 1870, the 
Court’s docket had reached 636 cases.88 The mounting work-
load required the Justices “either to slight their Supreme Court 
work with an undue delay in the disposition of appeals or to 
slight their circuit work by insufficient attendance on circuit, or 
both.”89 As a result, it became increasingly common for circuit 
court proceedings to be held by only a single district judge, who 
often reviewed his own prior rulings in a case.90 
Even though the Justices continued to request relief from 
their circuit duties, Congress was slow to respond. Congress 
 
Symposium, in 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2005). Terry was shot by 
Deputy U.S. Marshall David Neagle before he could kill Field. See In re Nea-
gle, 135 U.S. at 53. Neagle was eventually indicted for murder, but the Su-
preme Court later held that he had a federal immunity defense to the prosecu-
tion. See Rehnquist, supra, at 1225; Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, 
What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Su-
premacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2235–36 (2003). 
 81. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 49. Justice McKinley 
claimed that his circuit duties for the Ninth Circuit, which included Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, required him to travel approximately 
ten thousand miles per year. Id. 
 82. Glick, supra note 3, at 1806. 
 83. See id. at 1810 (recounting Justice Daniel’s experience of riding circuit 
“through yellow fever at Vicksburg and congestive and autumnal fevers” in 
Jackson). 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 1811 (describing Justice Daniel’s accommodations in “a 
beached and converted steamboat where he was housed in a room six feet by 
four feet and tormented by Buffalo gnats”). 
 85. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 34. 
 86. See id. at 34–35. 
 87. WARREN, supra note 65, at 676. 
 88. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 60. 
 89. Id. at 34. 
 90. See id. at 87 (“Such an appeal is not from Philip drunk to Philip sober, 
but from Philip sober to Philip intoxicated with the vanity of a matured opin-
ion and doubtless also a published decision.”). 
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partially eased the burden when it passed the Act of June 17, 
1844, which required only a single Justice to visit each district 
annually to hold circuit court.91 Besides that one piece of legis-
lation, the only assistance from Congress was an occasional ex-
tension of the Court’s Term for an additional month, permitting 
the Justices to hear a few of the cases that were accumulating 
on its increasingly overcrowded docket.92 When the docket be-
came further congested, the Court resorted to self-help, prom-
ulgating a rule limiting oral argument to two hours per side.93 
According to Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, the new rule 
“did something, but not much.”94 
Three chief factors contributed to congressional inaction on 
circuit riding. First, policymakers had fundamental disagree-
ments about the proper role of the federal judiciary, and these 
disagreements led to congressional impotence on a variety of 
issues, not just circuit riding.95 Indeed, political delay ham-
pered the resolution of such simple matters as reforming the 
circuit system to accommodate newly admitted states.96 The 
Civil War made matters worse as many Southerners ada-
mantly opposed any expansion of the federal judiciary,97 and 
states’ rights advocates feared that the elimination of circuit 
riding would lead to less respect for the states and a greater 
number of Supreme Court decisions supporting the assertion of 
federal power.98 
 
 91. See Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676. The Justices previously 
had their circuit riding duties reduced in much the same way under the Act of 
1793, which required the Justices to ride circuit within each district only once 
per year. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 22. However, when 
the country was later divided into six circuits and only a single Justice was 
assigned to each circuit, the Justices were once again required to ride circuit 
within each district twice annually. Id. at 31–32. But see id. at 32 (explaining 
that a provision in the Act of 1793 allowed a single district judge to preside 
over the circuit courts, a “provision . . . constantly invoked if circuit courts 
were to be held at all”). 
 92. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726; Act of June 17, 
1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676; Act of May 4, 1826, ch. 37, 4 Stat. 160. 
 93. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 52. 
 94. Id. at 52. 
 95. See id. at 80–85 (describing the political discussion about reorganizing 
the federal judiciary); Geyh, supra note 77, at 178 (“[D]eveloping and some-
times conflicting notions of judicial independence and accountability had put 
Congress in a box that was difficult to escape.”). 
 96. See Geyh, supra note 77, at 177–78. 
 97. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 84. 
 98. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1800. 
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Second, there was a general unwillingness to change the 
structure of the federal judiciary. Congress was reluctant to re-
form many aspects of the federal judicial system because it 
viewed the Judiciary Act of 1789 as the implementation of the 
Framers’ vision of an independent and robust judiciary.99 While 
some argued that changes to the judiciary should be treated no 
differently than legislation in other areas, “[t]he prevailing 
view was that legislation regulating the courts was different, 
because it altered the structure of an independent branch of 
government, the longstanding stability of which legislators ad-
mired and were desirous of preserving.”100 Specifically, the 
Midnight Judges Act was a particularly infamous historical 
precedent that, in the minds of many legislators, was not to be 
repeated.101 
Third, many in Congress continued to believe in the genu-
ine advantages of circuit riding. Although some still criticized 
circuit riding as outmoded, difficult, and wasteful,102 many oth-
ers repeatedly voiced their support. In fact, as Washington, 
D.C. became less centrally located through westward expan-
sion, policymakers feared that the elimination of circuit riding 
would separate the Court from the rest of the nation and that 
Justices would become “completely cloistered within the city of 
Washington.”103 Many legislators worried that the Court would 
become a “fossilized institution,”104 unaware of the business of 
the circuits, and that the decisions of the Court would “assume 
a severe and local character.”105 Other legislators viewed circuit 
riding as critical in keeping Justices knowledgeable about the 
practical realities of litigation to ensure that their decisions did 
not become too philosophical and unconnected from the com-
munities in which the decisions would be implemented.106 
Senator William Allen spoke particularly passionately and elo-
quently on behalf of the proponents of circuit riding in 1848: 
I would admonish those gentlemen, who do not think as I do on these 
points, but wish to maintain this Judiciary in its present features, 
 
 99. See Geyh, supra note 77, at 171. 
 100. Id. at 173. 
 101. See id. at 174–75. 
 102. See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 123–26 (1819) (describing and rejecting the 
arguments against circuit riding); WARREN, supra note 65, at 185–86; 
Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1404–05. 
 103. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 126 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 104. Geyh, supra note 77, at 186 (quoting Senator Williams). 
 105. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 126 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 106. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1809. 
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that if they do not wish to sound the tocsin, they had better not sepa-
rate the judges for an hour from circuit duties, and direct intercourse 
with the people of the State. That is the only feature in the system 
which connects them with the nation; and if that be struck out, the 
striking out of the court will follow as naturally as the snuffing of a 
candle issues in darkness.107 
As the docket continued to expand, however, the pressures 
on the Court became so overwhelming that the Justices could 
not always attend to their circuit duties. By the 1860s, the Su-
preme Court’s plenary docket had become a “record of arrears,” 
and the lengthy delay before obtaining a hearing and a decision 
from the Supreme Court had become unacceptable.108 Congress 
was forced to act and passed the Judiciary Act of 1869,109 which 
preserved the spirit of circuit riding but eased the burdens im-
posed on the Justices. The Act created one full-time circuit 
judge for each of the nine circuits and reduced the circuit re-
sponsibilities of the Justices to just one visit to each district 
within a circuit every other year.110 Nonetheless, throughout 
the 1880’s many Justices neglected their circuit duties alto-
gether,111 and it became increasingly clear that reform was nec-
essary. Justice William Strong advocated the creation of an in-
termediate court of appeals, writing that each Justice was 
spending approximately eight to twelve hours a day hearing 
and deciding cases from the opening of the Term in October un-
til its conclusion in May.112 Chief Justice Morrison Waite too 
spoke out on the onerous workload resulting from the Court’s 
bloated docket.113 
Finally, in 1891, Congress passed a bill sponsored by Sena-
tor William Evarts that established an intermediate court of 
appeals for the federal judiciary.114 In addition to a new tier of 
appellate review, the Evarts Act introduced the concept of dis-
 
 107. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 595–96 (1848). 
 108. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 69–70. By 1888, the 
Court was nearly three years behind in adjudicating the cases on its plenary 
docket. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Sev-
enty-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1650 (2000). 
 109. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 45–46. 
 110. See Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. 
 111. See WARD, supra note 42, at 89. 
 112. See William Strong, The Needs of the Supreme Court, 132 N. AM. REV. 
437, 439 (1881). 
 113. See Notes, 22 AM. L. REV. 269, 292 (1888) (quoting Chief Justice Mor-
rison R. Waite). 
 114. See Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, 
supra note 37, at 100–01. 
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cretionary review for the Supreme Court through the writ of 
certiorari, and simultaneously granted litigants an appeal as of 
right to one of the regional circuit courts of appeals.115 The Act 
transformed the Court’s plenary docket; only 275 new cases 
were docketed in 1892.116 
While neither the old circuit courts nor circuit riding were 
formally abolished under the Evarts Act, Justices were no 
longer statutorily required to sit as judges of either the old cir-
cuit courts or the newly created circuit courts of appeals.117 
While some Justices continued to ride circuit, most did not, and 
any confusion about the issue was finally dispelled when the 
old circuit courts were abolished in 1911,118 formally ending the 
storied 120-year history of circuit riding.119 
II.  A RENEWED CALL FOR CIRCUIT RIDING   
A. THE BURDENS AND ADVANTAGES OF A MODERN FORM OF 
CIRCUIT RIDING 
Although few scholars have focused on the practice of cir-
cuit riding,120 it was an important and original component of 
the Framers’ vision for an independent judiciary.121 For ap-
proximately half of this country’s history, it was a large, per-
haps even dominant, component of the job description of Su-
preme Court Justices.122 Congress ultimately abolished circuit 
 
 115. See Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826. 
 116. See 1893 ATT’Y GEN. ANNUAL REP., at iv; Glick, supra note 3, at 1827. 
 117. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1828. Under the Act, however, the Justices 
were “competent to sit as judges of the circuit court of appeals within their re-
spective circuits.” Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826; Glick, supra 
note 3, at 1828. 
 118. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. 
 119. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1829. 
 120. See id. at 1753 & n.2 (noting the paucity of research on the issue of 
circuit riding). Steven Calabresi and David Presser can be added to that short 
list of scholars. See generally Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17 (arguing for 
the reintroduction of circuit riding). 
 121. Many of the legislators who passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 also 
signed the U.S. Constitution. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 420 (1821) 
(“A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, certainly of not less au-
thority than that which has been just cited, is the [Judiciary Act of 1789]. We 
know that in the Congress which passed that act were many eminent mem-
bers of the Convention which formed the constitution.”); Tor Ekeland, Note, 
Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1516 (2005). 
 122. See supra Part I. 
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riding, not because it no longer served any purpose, but be-
cause of the difficulties and dangers associated with transcon-
tinental travel and because of the crushing caseload faced by 
the Supreme Court during the 1880s.123 
Neither of those issues is an impediment to a renewal of 
circuit riding today. First, today’s transportation system con-
sists of planes, trains, and automobiles, and Justices can travel 
across the country by jet plane in just a few hours. The accom-
modations in even the most remote parts of the country greatly 
exceed the standards of lodging available during the 1800s, 
when Justices were sometimes forced to share a room with 
strangers or even sleep in their stagecoaches.124 The availabil-
ity of the Internet and telephones in every part of the country 
ensures that Justices would be able to vote in time-sensitive 
death penalty cases and keep in touch with their chambers dur-
ing the week in which they are circuit riding. Indeed, some of 
the current Justices spend most of their summers away from 
Washington, and they are able to keep up with their work from 
virtually anywhere in the world without much difficulty.125 
Second, the plenary docket is no longer anywhere near the 
plateau reached during the mid-1880s. When Congress effec-
tively abolished circuit riding in 1891, the number of signed 
opinions released by the Supreme Court over the prior decade 
ranged from a low of 232 in 1881 to a high of 298 in 1886.126 
Even so, the Court was more than three years behind on its 
work.127 Since 1986, by contrast, the Court has been hearing 
fewer cases; it issued just seventy-four signed opinions during 
both the 2002 and 2003 Terms, a lower output than in any year 
since 1865.128 With the elimination of the Supreme Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988, the Court has had 
 
 123. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1404–05. For a discussion 
of the other reasons why circuit riding was abolished, see id. at 1406–08. 
 124. See id. at 1404; Glick, supra note 3, at 1765 & n.79. 
 125. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, High Court, Low Profile, BALT. SUN, Aug. 
31, 2004, at 15A, available at 2004 WLNR 1472804 (describing Justice 
Souter’s summers in New Hampshire); Some Justices Make Summer Busman’s 
Holiday, NEWSDAY, Aug. 26, 2002, at A13, available at 2002 WLNR 511032 
(discussing Justice Thomas’s trips in his motor home during the summer 
months). 
 126. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3. In contrast, over 
the first sixty years of circuit riding, the Supreme Court never even reached 
triple digits in the number of signed opinions released annually. See id. 
 127. See Hartnett, supra note 108, at 1650. 
 128. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3. 
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nearly unlimited discretion in setting the size of its plenary 
docket, subject to only a few, nonmaterial exceptions.129 The fol-
lowing chart graphically displays the reduction in the Court’s 
plenary docket since 1986, as compared to when circuit riding 
was effectively abolished in the late 1800s:130 














      
Supreme Court Term 
As the above chart demonstrates, the Court was deciding 
more than three times as many cases in the mid-1880s as it 
does today. Moreover, as Calabresi and Presser point out, the 
primary failing of the old circuit riding system was that it 
placed too much “reliance on Supreme Court Justice manpower 
to do appreciable quantities of lower court work.”131 Today, 
with 651 district judges and 179 circuit judges authorized by 
Congress (not including senior judges),132 there are plenty of 
judges to handle the caseload, even though dockets have been 
steadily rising in the lower federal courts.133 Circuit-riding Jus-
 
 129. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. The cate-
gories of cases over which the Court currently exercises mandatory review add 
“very little to the Court’s workload.” See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, 
The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 97 
(1989). 
 130. All data for the chart are derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, 
at 232–36 tbl.3-3. 
 131. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1410. 
 132. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 133(a) (2000). 
 133. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
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tices would assist the lower courts in keeping up with the de-
mands of their dockets, to be sure, but they would not be re-
quired to shoulder the majority, or even an appreciable 
amount, of the workload, as was required under the old circuit 
court system. Instead, a renewal of circuit riding would be 
premised on the considerable advantages it would confer on the 
Court, the Justices, and the general public. 
The historic support for circuit riding was based largely on 
the odious effects of having the Justices confined to Washing-
ton, D.C. to perform their work. Representative James Bu-
chanan stated in 1826 that “[i]f the Supreme Court should ever 
become a political tribunal, it will not be until the Judges shall 
be settled in Washington, far removed from the People, and 
within the immediate influence of the power and patronage of 
the Executive.”134 Although the judiciary was not intended to 
be as political as the legislative or executive branches, the 
Framers surely did not intend to isolate it from the general 
citizenry either, as even the earliest statements about circuit 
riding make clear.135 Citizens may not flock to the circuit courts 
to see the Justices in action, as they did during the early years 
of circuit riding. But modern circuit riding appearances would 
surely provide greater exposure for the Justices and the Court, 
similar to the extensive media coverage accompanying the re-
cent visits by Sandra Day O’Connor to the Second, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits.136 
Circuit riding would also expose the Justices to judges and 
communities with which they are unfamiliar. Many Justices 
over the course of history have led cloistered lives, with the 
most notable recent example being Justice Souter, who returns 
to New Hampshire every summer after the Term ends and 
rarely makes public appearances.137 At a minimum, circuit rid-
ing for one week per year would require the Justices to interact 
with local judges and members of the bar. At most, their visits 
 
 134. 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826). 
 135. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., A Supreme Surprise for N.Y. Lawyers, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 
2006, at A20, available at 2006 WLNR 17665008; Howard Mintz, Retired Jus-
tice O’Connor Helps in S.F. Court, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, at 
B1, available at 2006 WLNR 18149282; Donna Walter, Eighth Circuit Appeals 
Panel Examines Voting Rights, DAILY REC. (Kan. City, Mo.), Feb. 13, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 2917024. 
 137. See Lithwick, supra note 125; Mark Walsh, Reclusive Justice Souter 
Attends N.H. Ceremony, 25 EDUC. WK., Apr. 19, 2006, at 26, available at 2006 
WLNR 7497386. 
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could turn into noteworthy annual events for some communi-
ties, resulting in coverage by local newspapers and social en-
gagements open to local lawyers, judges, or even the general 
public. 
Other advantages of circuit riding accrue directly to the 
Justices and the Court. Professors Arthur Hellman and Caro-
lyn Shapiro have argued that the Court has become increas-
ingly “Olympian” over the past two decades, issuing fewer opin-
ions but granting certiorari in a relatively increasing number of 
important cases that permit it to make sweeping legal rul-
ings.138 Professor Shapiro further criticizes the Court for an-
nouncing “rules and standards [in plenary cases] often without 
applying them to the factual situations from which they 
arise.”139 In a dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist offered a similar 
critique: 
The Court, I believe, makes an even greater mistake in failing to ap-
ply its newly announced rule to the facts of this case. Instead of thus 
illustrating how the rule works, it contents itself with abstractions 
and paraphrases of abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much like 
a treatise about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and 
has no intention of starting now.140 
In addition, the Justices do not have an opportunity to 
watch closely the development of various areas of federal law, 
primarily because the Court grants certiorari in so few cases 
each year.141 Instead, the Court takes a piecemeal approach to 
its supervisory function, commonly reviewing and deciding le-
gal questions only after the lower courts have become squarely 
divided. Consequently, there is rarely a unifying theme in the 
 
 138. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 433–38; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian 
Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 288 (2006). 
 139. See Shapiro, supra note 138, at 313–14. 
 140. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 269 (1986) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (“The Court 
grandly declares that ‘[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a com-
prehensive definition of testimonial. But the thousands of federal prosecutors 
and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond 
the specific kinds of testimony the Court lists is covered by the new rule. They 
need them now, not months or years from now.’”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in judgment) (citations omitted). 
 141. Arguably, reading petitions for certiorari could keep the Justices 
abreast of important developments in federal law. However, at least two Jus-
tices (Stevens and Rehnquist) have admitted in the past that they do not read 
most petitions for certiorari, and the Court largely leaves the initial screening 
of petitions to law clerks. See Stras, supra note 133, at 46, 53, 54. 
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cases the Court reviews each Term,142 and it often takes years 
for an issue to resurface on the Court’s plenary docket.143 Thus, 
the Justices are not regularly forced to grapple with the gaps or 
inconsistencies in the Court’s contemporary opinions or the 
challenges faced by lower courts in implementing them.144 
A renewal of circuit riding may alleviate the problems 
posed by “the Court’s current distance from the daily work of 
the lower courts”145 and encourage the Justices to “become 
more sensitive to administrative and jurisprudential headaches 
they create for the lower courts.”146 By sitting on the lower 
courts, even for a short period, the Justices would be required 
to engage in the type of fact-intensive analysis of cases that is 
commonplace in the lower federal courts, and to even apply the 
Court’s precedents, a practice which could foster some humility 
when the Justices return each October to decide an additional 
batch of Supreme Court cases.147 
 
 142. Sometimes the Court does take a group of cases to clarify an area of 
federal law. For instance, in 1999 the Court decided a trio of cases under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that addressed various aspects of that 
law, including whether corrective or mitigating measures can be considered in 
determining coverage under the ADA. See Albertson’s, Inc. v Kirkingburg, 527 
U.S. 555, 558 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). 
 143. Although there are numerous examples of this phenomenon, one 
prominent example is the lengthy, nearly twenty-year period between the 
Court’s opinion in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 
804 (1986), and its subsequent decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. 
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), clarifying the 
standard for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for state law 
claims that present questions of federal law. In the employment discrimina-
tion area, the Court took approximately fourteen years to finally resolve the 
important question of whether direct evidence of discrimination is required in 
mixed-motive cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compare 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71 (1989) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (holding that the plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimina-
tion to trigger the mixed-motive analysis), with Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding that the plaintiff did not need to prove dis-
crimination by direct evidence in mixed-motive cases). 
 144. See Hellman, supra note 138, at 435 (“When the Court addresses a 
particular statute or doctrine only in isolated cases at long intervals, the Jus-
tices may not fully appreciate how the particular issue fits into its larger set-
ting.”). 
 145. Shapiro, supra note 138, at 329. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. The U.S. courts of appeals, for instance, are often asked to re-
view a district court’s grant of summary judgment or a jury verdict for suffi-
ciency of the evidence. Those types of cases, as well as many others, require 
circuit judges to apply and evaluate facts in making their decisions. 
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Aside from humility and perspective, circuit riding would 
also require the Justices to decide cases in areas of the law in 
which the Court is not traditionally interested. It is no secret 
that the Court rarely hears cases involving state law, yet many 
cases on the Court’s plenary docket involve the type of general 
common law questions for which background knowledge of 
state law would prove useful. Many areas of federal law require 
familiarity with the common law: ERISA cases involve common 
law trust principles,148 FELA cases incorporate common law 
tort doctrines,149 and cases involving sentencing enhancements 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act require comparison be-
tween a state’s definition of an offense and the generic defini-
tion of an offense adopted by a majority of states.150 Although 
there are numerous other examples, requiring the Justices to 
decide diversity cases while sitting on the circuit courts would 
improve their effectiveness when cases requiring knowledge of 
general common law principles, such as ERISA and FELA 
cases, appear on the Court’s plenary docket. 
Riding circuit would also expose Justices to areas of federal 
law over which the Court generally does not exercise plenary 
review. For example, the Court has expressed doubt about 
whether it should ever grant plenary review over cases involv-
ing the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, primarily 
because Congress placed in the Sentencing Commission the au-
thority to “periodically review the work of the courts, and . . . 
make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflict-
ing judicial decisions might suggest,” including retroactive 
 
 148. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). ERISA 
is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which sets uniform stan-
dards for employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000); see Margaret 
E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers: Re-
straints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hos-
tile Takeovers, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 735–36 (1983). 
 149. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541–42 
(1994). FELA is the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 
(2000), which makes “railroads liable for injuries or deaths suffered by their 
employees in interstate commerce as a result of the negligence of the railroad’s 
other employees, agents, or officers.” Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General 
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 520 (2006). 
 150. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990). The Su-
preme Court recently decided a case raising a similar issue, United States v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815, 818 (2007), in which the question presented 
was whether a violation of California’s vehicle-theft statute qualified as a 
“theft” offense, which is a subcategory of “aggravated felon[ies]” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2000). 
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changes.151 In other areas as well, such as cases involving the 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has 
been relatively quiet in recent years.152 Yet these are important 
areas of federal law as, for instance, the Supreme Court pos-
sesses statutory responsibility for the issuance and amendment 
of the various federal rules of evidence and procedure,153 and as 
sentencing issues have been garnering increased attention from 
academics and policymakers in recent years.154 By sitting on 
the circuit courts, which regularly hear cases on the Sentencing 
Guidelines and the federal rules, the Justices would both aug-
ment the breadth of their knowledge of federal law and 
strengthen their ability to carry out their statutory responsi-
bilities.155 
Finally, circuit riding would encourage Justices to retire in 
a timely manner, before the onset of mental or physical infir-
mity. For Justices who are mentally or physically infirm, in-
creasing the workload can make the job more difficult, varied, 
and exhausting, even though the new duties may not be very 
challenging for Justices in good health. Mental and physical in-
firmity has been and inevitably will continue to be a serious 
problem on the Supreme Court, and in a prior co-authored arti-
cle, I even proposed a package of retirement incentives—a 
“golden parachute” for Supreme Court Justices—to alleviate 
the problem.156 Congress possesses other tools to encourage 
timely retirement, including the power to increase the Justices’ 
workload by expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court or by adding supplementary duties to their job de-
 
 151. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). 
 152. The last time the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving interpre-
tation of the Federal Rules of Evidence was approximately seven years ago. 
See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000). 
 153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
 154. See, e.g., Symposium, Sentencing: Learning From, and Worrying 
About, the States?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 933, 933–36 (2005); Symposium, Sen-
tencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2005); see also Mandatory Sentencing 
Is Criticized by Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1994, at A22 (“‘I simply do not 
see how Congress can be satisfied with the results of mandatory minimums for 
possession of crack cocaine.’” (quoting Justice Kennedy)). 
 155. Because the Sentencing Guidelines did not go into effect until Novem-
ber 1, 1987, Justices Stevens and Scalia did not hear any cases involving in-
terpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to their elevation to the Su-
preme Court in 1975 and 1986, respectively. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2, available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 
2007). 
 156. Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1455–59. 
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scriptions.157 As Calabresi and Presser argue, circuit riding is a 
“reasonable way of accomplishing that goal.”158 
Indeed, Professors David Nixon and J. David Haskin con-
ducted a study in which they concluded that adding to judicial 
workload increases the probability of retirement.159 Using each 
month on the appellate court as a separate observation in their 
regression analysis, Nixon and Haskin found that “personal 
factors such as workload . . . are the most substantively and 
statistically significant factors affecting aggregate retire-
ments.”160 Two other empirical studies of lower court judges 
confirm the relationship between workload and retirement.161 
As I have written previously, “[t]hese studies suggest that in-
creasing the workload of Justices, which in turn increases the 
amount of time spent on judging rather than leisure, will make 
retirement more attractive for the average Justice.”162 Accord-
ingly, in addition to the institutional and personal benefits of 
circuit riding, its renewal will also encourage mentally and 
physically infirm Justices to retire in a timely manner. 
B. THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF 2007 
Even though the practice of circuit riding began with the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has never provided much speci-
ficity with respect to the circuit duties of the Justices. For in-
stance, the Judiciary Act of 1789 simply stated that “there shall 
be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts, 
which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any 
two Justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judge of 
such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum.”163 
In contrast, that Act exhaustively discussed the jurisdiction of 
 
 157. See id. at 1436. 
 158. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1415. 
 159. See David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial Retirement Strategies: 
The Judge’s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM. 
POL. Q. 458, 471–72 (2000). 
 160. See id. at 480. The authors measured judicial workload by calculating 
the “the number of case filings per judge.” Id. at 466. 
 161. See Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of 
Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts, 1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 469 (1990); 
James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retire-
ment on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 590 
(1995). 
 162. Stras, supra note 12, at 1437. 
 163. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 4, 1 Stat. 74–75. 
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the Supreme Court, the old circuit courts, and the district 
courts.164 
To avoid the lack of guidance accompanying past legisla-
tion, I recommend that Congress enact my proposed circuit rid-
ing legislation, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007. The Act carefully 
delineates the additional requirements that would be placed on 
the Justices. First, rather than requiring them to conduct trials 
at the district court level, as Calabresi and Presser have re-
cently proposed, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 calls for the Jus-
tices to spend five days (or about one work week) per year sit-
ting on panels of the U.S. courts of appeals. Second, the 
proposed Act ensures that Justices sit with as many different 
panels and judges as possible during their brief circuit riding 
visits, while accommodating the prevailing practice of some cir-
cuits to have one panel sit together for an entire week of hear-
ings. Third, the Act makes clear that the Justices’ additional 
circuit duties will not interfere with their Court obligations be-
cause the requirements of the Act may only be satisfied during 
the summer months when the Court is in recess.165 Fourth, the 
Act expressly provides for the payment of reasonable expenses 
incurred by the Justices while riding circuit, including lodging 
and transportation, and augments their existing salaries to 
compensate them for the additional work required by the 
Act.166 
The Circuit Riding Act of 2007 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 42) 
(a) The Chief Justice of the United States and the asso-
ciate Justices of the Supreme Court shall from time to 
time be allotted as circuit Justices among the circuits by 
 
 164. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 165. If there are circuits that do not regularly schedule oral argument ses-
sions during the summer months, then the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would 
require them to annually schedule at least a single panel of the court of ap-
peals during the months of July, August, or September, which is at most a mi-
nor imposition. 
 166. The payment of additional compensation to the Justices avoids any 
serious argument that Congress has unconstitutionally diminished the Jus-
tices’ salaries, even though any such argument would likely be doomed to fail-
ure anyway. The Constitution, by its terms, does not require that federal 
judges receive supplementary compensation for additional duties or work, only 
that their salaries not be diminished during their continuance in office. See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall, at stated Times, 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished dur-
ing their Continuance in Office”); Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1419–21. 
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order of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice may 
make such allotments in vacation. A Justice may be as-
signed to more than one circuit, and two or more Jus-
tices may be assigned to the same circuit.167 
(b) The Chief Justice of the United States and the asso-
ciate Justices of the Supreme Court shall participate in 
the work of the United States Courts of Appeals in the 
following manner: 
(1) The Chief Justice and the associate Justices shall 
each participate in one or more panels of the United 
States Courts of Appeals for a minimum of five days 
each year; 
(2) Justices assigned to two circuits pursuant to this 
section shall spend a minimum of five days sitting on 
each circuit to which they are assigned over every 
two-year period; 
(3) Justices assigned to a single circuit pursuant to 
this section shall spend a minimum of five days sit-
ting on the circuit to which they are assigned and a 
minimum of five days on another circuit over every 
two-year period; 
(4) These duties may be performed at any time be-
tween July 1 and October 1 of each year, as agreed to 
by each Justice and respective circuit; 
(5) In no circumstance shall a Justice sit with the 
same judge for more than five days in any two-year 
period; 
(6) No more than one Justice may sit on a panel in 
order to fulfill the requirements of this section; 
(7) The Justices are ineligible to vote on or partici-
pate in an en banc rehearing of any case decided by 
the Courts of Appeals, but are eligible to vote for 
 
 167. Subsection (a) mirrors the language of the current 28 U.S.C. § 42. The 
remainder of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is new and thus would require leg-
islative action. Supreme Court Rules 21 and 22 govern the in-chambers prac-
tices of the Supreme Court with respect to motions and stay applications, in-
cluding the duties of Circuit Justices. SUP. CT. R. 21, 22. 
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panel rehearing if they were a member of the origi-
nal panel that heard the case; 
(8) Participation by the Justices through video ar-
guments or teleconferencing shall not fulfill the re-
quirements of this section. 
(c) The chief judge of each circuit shall be responsible for 
scheduling cases and panels so that the Justices may 
fulfill the requirements of this section. 
(d) Provision shall be made for payment of reasonable 
travel, lodging, and other expenses incurred by the Jus-
tices in fulfilling the requirements of this section. 
(e) The annual salaries of the Justices shall be adjusted 
to provide $3000 in additional compensation for each 
day a Justice sits on a panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals. 
C. THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF 
2007 
A modern circuit riding proposal must consider both the 
individual competencies of members of the Court and the 
strengths and limitations of the courts that would host the Jus-
tices. Calabresi and Presser would require Justices to spend 
four weeks per year conducting trials and performing the work 
of a district judge.168 While the Justices would no doubt benefit 
from the experience of serving as trial judges, the modern reali-
ties and demands of litigation render that proposal impractical. 
By contrast, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is closely tailored to 
the strengths of the Justices and the competencies of the circuit 
courts by focusing the Justices’ efforts on the familiar demands 
of appellate adjudication rather than the vagaries of trial liti-
gation. 
The role of a federal district judge today differs dramati-
cally from the days when Justices rode circuit. During the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular, litigation in 
federal courts centered around a “trial-based procedure” in 
which the district judge or circuit judge (of the old circuit 
courts) served as an impartial adjudicator of disputes.169 In 
 
 168. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1388–89. 
 169. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil 
Process, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 631, 639; see also Paul D. Carrington, A New Con-
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criminal cases, for example, jurors might sit “for not one but a 
whole series of trials” and most trials were “over within a day,” 
with many ending even “within an hour.”170 Today, by contrast, 
the median time from filing to final judgment in a criminal case 
is fourteen months when a defendant receives a jury trial.171 
The nature of federal litigation on the civil side has also 
changed dramatically in recent years, particularly since the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 
The Rules “interposed a number of new steps between the 
commencement of litigation and trial, each of which could yield 
a judicial ruling and thus require judicial time.”172 Federal dis-
trict judges are now required to assume a “managerial” role in 
the conduct of civil litigation,173 in which the pretrial process 
rather than the trial itself is the “main event.”174 These pretrial 
tasks, comprising a significant part of the civil work of district 
judges, include “ruling on discovery disputes, deciding joinder 
issues, conducting pretrial and settlement conferences, and . . . 
punishing lawyers for misbehavior.”175 After the plaintiff files a 
complaint, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss or for a 
change of venue, and then the parties may conduct discovery 
that can last for months or even years.176 At the conclusion of 
the discovery phase, one or both parties may file a motion for 
summary judgment, and then it may be months before a trial 
commences. In the twelve-month period ending September 30, 
 
federacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 932–44 (1996) 
(examining the changing role of federal district courts from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century). 
 170. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 692 (2004). Friedman’s study contained many generali-
zations about litigation prior to the twentieth century and did not distinguish 
between federal and state trials. 
 171. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 255 tbl.D6 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judbus2005/appendices/d6.pdf. For cases ending in dismissal the median is 6.2 
months, while the median duration of a bench trial is approximately 7.3 
months. See id. 
 172. Yeazell, supra note 169, at 639. 
 173. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 378–79 
(1982) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have shifted the role 
of judges from adjudicators to managers of litigation). 
 174. Judith Resnick, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming 
the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000). 
 175. Yeazell, supra note 169, at 639. 
 176. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in De-
cline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 511 (1986) (noting that, although not typical, 
some cases take months to complete discovery). 
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2005, civil cases concluding before trial usually took around 
thirteen months from the time of filing.177 Civil cases that 
reached trial took even longer—approximately twenty-two 
months from the date of filing until final judgment.178 
For both criminal and civil cases, the district courts would 
have difficulty accommodating Justices for a finite period of 
only four weeks each year.179 Even if it is unnecessary for the 
Justices to manage a case from beginning to end, there are few 
activities (other than a trial) that would provide meaningful 
experience for the Justices over such a brief period. Moreover, 
because of the increased emphasis on managing a case from the 
beginning, Justices would be at a significant disadvantage if 
they were asked to conduct a trial without being involved in the 
pretrial process.180 And even the comparatively simple task of 
sentencing criminal defendants requires some familiarity with 
the factual context of each case, which is often gained through 
a judge’s participation in the guilt phase of a trial. The lag be-
tween the guilt and sentencing phases of many criminal trials 
would make even this routine assignment difficult for circuit-
 
 177. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 171, at 
188 tbl.C5. 
 178. See id. In 1963, by contrast, the median interval between filing and 
final judgment in a civil trial was just sixteen months. See Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 480–81 fig.13 (2004). 
 179. As a result, it is far too simplistic to argue that Justices today can 
conduct trials because “famous Justices from John Marshall to Stephen Field 
rode circuit and tried cases.” Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1408. 
 180. Indeed, the Court has made a similar point regarding its role in the 
trial of cases under the Court’s original jurisdiction: “This Court is . . . struc-
tured to perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of fact-
finding and so forced, in original cases, awkwardly to play the role of fact 
finder without actually presiding over the introduction of evidence.” Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). 
To be sure, then-Justice William Rehnquist presided over a federal trial in 
Richmond, Virginia, in 1984, and the district court appeared to have no prob-
lem accommodating his presence. See Aaron Epstein, Cameras to Capture the 
Elusive Rehnquist, N.J. RECORD, Jan. 7, 1999, at A8. In an interesting turn of 
events, however, the Fourth Circuit later reversed Justice Rehnquist’s deci-
sion to permit the case to go forward to trial. See Chief Justice’s Other Trial 
Was Overturned, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 2, 1999, at A14. It is unclear the extent 
to which Rehnquist’s unfamiliarity with the background of the case made the 
task more difficult for him, and whether such unfamiliarity contributed to the 
case’s reversal in the Fourth Circuit. It bears mentioning, however, that few 
modern Justices have presided over trials. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 
17, at 1406. 
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riding Justices.181 Put simply, it would be extremely difficult, 
perhaps even an outright waste of judicial resources, for dis-
trict courts to isolate and assign discrete aspects of civil and 
criminal cases to the Justices, and such an approach is unlikely 
to result in much meaningful experience for the Justices.182 
In contrast to the district courts, the federal circuit courts 
can readily accommodate the participation of Supreme Court 
Justices. In most cases before the courts of appeals, the factual 
record has been fully developed and the legal issues have been 
considerably narrowed. Moreover, appeals are ordinarily more 
predictable than trials, as oral arguments are often scheduled 
weeks or months in advance, the parties are usually not able to 
alter the hearing date through strategic maneuvering, and the 
record and briefs are available to members of the panel prior to 
the hearing. In addition, Justices would be able to prepare in 
advance by reviewing the briefs, record, and any applicable 
federal and state cases. Prior to oral argument, the Justices can 
even discuss the issues in a particular case, if necessary, with 
other members of the panel through electronic mail, letters, or 
telephone calls. Moreover, by conversing with other members of 
appellate panels, the Justices would encounter a greater vari-
ety of viewpoints and personalities than they would by perform-
ing their work alone in the district courts as Calabresi and 
Presser propose.183 
 
 181. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 
951, 1004–05 n.188 (2003) (noting that in the federal courts the preparation of 
pre-sentence investigation reports results in the sentencing hearing “tak[ing] 
place several weeks or even months after the verdict or guilty plea”). Of 
course, a criminal case that ends in a plea agreement would likely allow the 
Justices sufficient time to participate in the sentencing of a defendant. How-
ever, such a truncated process is unlikely to result in the type of meaningful 
trial experience advocated by Calabresi and Presser. 
 182. A circuit riding plan requiring the Justices to handle just a few cases 
each year, but not setting a finite time limit for their participation in the work 
of the district courts, would avoid many of the problems associated with 
Calabresi and Presser’s plan. An open-ended proposal lacking firm time limits, 
however, would likely have the unfortunate consequence of interfering with 
the Justices’ work obligations on the Supreme Court as their circuit riding du-
ties would linger into the Court’s Term. 
 183. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the old circuit courts included appeals from 
the decisions of district courts in certain types of cases. See supra notes 23–24 
and accompanying text. Moreover, one of the benefits of the early circuit riding 
system was that the Justices were exposed to district court judges while sit-
ting on three-judge panels. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. The 
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would further emphasize that advantage by having 
the Justices sit with two lower court judges on each panel, rather than just one 
district judge as required under the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
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The work that often lingers after a hearing before the 
courts of appeals—such as the drafting of opinions and sub-
stantive discussions among members of a panel—would be 
unlikely to interfere with the Justices’ obligations to the Su-
preme Court. Most of the interaction among members of an ap-
pellate panel occurs immediately after oral argument when the 
judges decide the outcome of the cases during conference, and 
any subsequent communications are often in the form of elec-
tronic mail, including circulated draft opinions. Unlike trial 
work, performing the functions of a circuit judge would not re-
quire the Justices to maintain a physical presence, other than 
during the hearings. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe 
that the Justices would not be able to participate fully in the 
work of the courts of appeals while simultaneously discharging 
their duties to the Supreme Court.184 
In addition to the aforementioned issues of institutional 
competency, the Justices are also not particularly well-suited 
for trial court work either. Of the present members of the Su-
preme Court, only Justice Souter has any experience as a trial 
judge,185 and none has experience as a federal district judge. In 
addition, only Justice Alito has spent any appreciable time as a 
federal prosecutor, and it not clear whether any of the other 
Justices tried cases during their pre-judicial careers. Moreover, 
senior Justices such as Sandra Day O’Connor have overwhelm-
ingly elected to participate in panels of the U.S. courts of ap-
peals rather than sit as district judges.186 In sum, the Justices’ 
 
 184. Although it is a minor point, the courts of appeals are also better 
equipped than the district courts to accommodate the Justices’ physical pres-
ence. Most appellate courtrooms have at least three seats on the bench, with 
some having more to accommodate an en banc argument. Indeed, senior Jus-
tices have regularly sat by designation on the courts of appeals without much 
difficulty. In contrast, trial work would require either the temporary use of an 
empty courtroom or for one of the existing district court judges to temporarily 
abandon or share his courtroom. It is also possible that the Justices’ participa-
tion in the work of the district courts would require the hiring of additional (or 
at least the sharing of ) court personnel, such as marshals, court reporters, and 
courtroom deputies. 
 185. Justice Souter spent five years as a New Hampshire Superior Court 
judge prior to becoming a Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. See 5 
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MA-
JOR OPINIONS 1809 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997). 
 186. For example, Lexis searches of the judicial activities of three senior 
Justices revealed that they sat exclusively on the courts of appeals. The search 
dates were taken from the date of each Justice’s retirement until their death 
(and until April 17, 2007 in the case of Justice O’Connor). The search terms 
were JUDGES (full name of the judge including middle initial). The results 
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pre-judicial careers and post-retirement activities do not sug-
gest that they would be comfortable or competent to perform 
the work of district judges. 
Calabresi and Presser argue, however, that one of the pri-
mary advantages of their proposal is that the Justices would 
acquire new skills by learning “more about how trial courts ac-
tually work and about what is happening on the front lines of 
our court system.”187 While I share Calabresi and Presser’s 
view that the Justices should become more knowledgeable 
about the trial process, I remain unconvinced that spending 
four weeks a year as a district judge is the only means of 
achieving that objective. Unlike the certiorari process before 
the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals exercise mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction over a wide range of cases and issues, 
many of which would expose the Justices to the nuances of trial 
practice. For instance, deciding cases involving whether a dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment is appropriate, 
whether a sentence for a criminal defendant is reasonable, or 
whether a district court abuses its discretion in the admission 
of evidence, all of which are issues that the Supreme Court 
generally ignores,188 would educate the Justices about the is-
sues facing the district courts without placing them in the 
awkward position of performing tasks for which they are ar-
guably unqualified.189 Indeed, as Judge Posner has observed, 
“[t]he position of a court of appeals judge provides a good van-
tage point for evaluating the work of district judges.”190 Accord-
 
were as follows: Justice O’Connor has sat on a total of fifteen cases in the Sec-
ond, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits since her retirement on January 31, 2006; 
Justice Byron White sat on a total of seventy-four cases in the Fifth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth circuits between June 28, 1993, and April 15, 2002; Justice 
Tom Clark sat on 338 cases in several circuits between June 12, 1967, and 
June 13, 1977. The searches turned up no instances of a Justice sitting as a 
district judge. 
 187. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1408. 
 188. These types of cases, unless the lower court misstates or incorrectly 
decides an issue of law, tend to be denied because they involve “erroneous fac-
tual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” See SUP. 
CT. R. 10. 
 189. I also question whether four weeks per year is sufficient time for the 
Justices to become fully acquainted with the trial process. Because most cases 
before the district courts last for months or even years, circuit-riding Justices 
would manage only discrete aspects of a case, and then only for a month each 
year. See supra notes 169–82 and accompanying text. Mastering the myriad of 
tasks that the district courts face, however, can take months or even years of 
experience. See Resnick, supra note 173, at 391–413. 
 190. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
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ingly, considerations of institutional and individual competency 
favor a proposal, such as the Circuit Riding Act of 2007, requir-
ing the Justices to spend one week per year participating in the 
work of the U.S. courts of appeals rather than performing the 
unfamiliar duties of a district judge. 
D. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF 2007 
Despite the numerous advantages from a renewal of circuit 
riding, skeptics of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 could raise a 
number of potential objections. First, although the constitu-
tionality of circuit riding has been settled for over two hundred 
years, the paucity of analysis from the Court in Stuart v. 
Laird191 could encourage litigants to renew some of the original 
questions about the constitutionality of the practice. Second, as 
with earlier attacks on the circuit riding, some may argue that 
its renewal would take the Justices away from their substantial 
Court obligations and render it more difficult for them to keep 
up with the demands of their offices. Third, skeptics may argue 
that the advantages discussed in Parts II.A and II.C are largely 
illusory, or point to insurmountable political barriers in reinsti-
tuting a modern form of circuit riding. 
As discussed above, circuit riding raises a number of inter-
esting constitutional questions that the Court considered and 
ultimately rejected in Stuart. Although none of the arguments 
were specifically addressed in any detail, the Court concluded 
that “acquiescence” and “practice” under the circuit riding sys-
tem for a number of years had fixed its constitutionality.192 The 
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 arguably implicates two of the con-
stitutional objections raised by the parties in Stuart. 
Litigants may first argue that having the Justices sit on 
the courts of appeals for even one week per year violates the 
Appointments Clause because the new duties would be incon-
sistent with their appointment as Justices of the Supreme 
Court. Under the Supreme Court’s prevailing case law, Con-
gress may add duties to an office, but those new duties must be 
germane.193 As I have explained previously, even the onerous 
form of circuit riding practiced at the end of the eighteenth cen-
 
336 (1996). 
 191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 192. See id. at 305. 
 193. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1994) (applying a 
germaneness standard to an Appointments Clause challenge to military offi-
cers sitting as military judges). 
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tury was constitutional because it added only germane judicial 
duties to the office of a Supreme Court Justice.194 The Circuit 
Riding Act of 2007 would require the Justices to spend only one 
week per year sitting on panels of the courts of appeals, which 
is far less burdensome than the months of circuit riding that 
were required by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Moreover, requiring 
Justices to sit on the lower federal courts is a classic example of 
downward designation, which is the least constitutionally prob-
lematic form of judicial designation.195 Thus, to find the Circuit 
Riding Act of 2007 unconstitutional arguably would draw into 
doubt the ability of a federal judge at any level of the judicial 
hierarchy to sit by designation (upward, lateral, or downward) 
on any other lower federal court, a longstanding practice that 
has become an integral tool in coping with the mounting work-
loads in the lower federal courts.196 Finally, the character of the 
added duties—judicial work in the lower federal courts197—is 
surely germane for many of the reasons discussed in this Arti-
cle, most notably the exposure that the Justices would receive 
to areas of federal law that are largely neglected on the Su-
preme Court’s plenary docket.198 
 
 194. See Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1408, 1416–17. 
 195. See id. at 1417–18. 
 196. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Ex-
periment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 795 (2004) (listing 
the thousands of cases decided by each circuit from 1982 to 2004 that involved 
a judge sitting by designation); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Di-
luting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges 
Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 351, 359–63 (1995) (examining the widespread use of district court 
judges sitting by designation on the courts of appeals as a result of increased 
caseloads). 
If hearing cases on the lower federal courts is nongermane to the office of 
a Supreme Court Justice, then arguably any federal judge who sits on a court 
to which she was not appointed would be participating in a violation of the 
Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The counterargument, of 
course, is that the “supreme Court” is specifically referred to in the Constitu-
tion, while all other federal courts are mentioned only under the “one-size fits 
all” category of the “inferior Courts.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. art. III, 
§ 1. A corollary of that argument is that Justices of the Supreme Court occupy 
distinct offices from judges of the inferior courts. See Stras & Scott, supra note 
12, at 1409–10. Consequently, striking down the power of Supreme Court Jus-
tices to sit on the lower courts would have only indirect bearing on the inter-
changeability of federal judges at other levels of the judicial hierarchy. Resolu-
tion of this difficult question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article and 
merits a separate discussion of its own. 
 197. Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1416 n.98. 
 198. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of sen-
tencing, procedural, and evidentiary issues. 
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A second, more troublesome argument is that litigants who 
appear before a panel with a Supreme Court Justice may later 
be deprived of nine unbiased Justices in a hearing before the 
Supreme Court.199 During the early years of circuit riding, At-
torney General Edmund Randolph raised this issue as an im-
portant cost of circuit riding.200 Two outcomes are possible if 
such a case is placed on the plenary docket of the Supreme 
Court: (1) an arguably biased Justice hears the case if she re-
fuses to recuse herself; or (2) the affected Justice recuses her-
self, but leaves the Court with only eight qualified members to 
hear the case. While the latter option removes any specter of 
bias,201 it does raise the possibility that a greater number of 
cases could be affirmed by an equally divided Court, in which 
the Court affirms the lower court decision in a one- or two-line 
per curiam opinion.202 Cases affirmed by an equally divided 
court tend to waste the Court’s time and resources and leave 
the lower courts in continued disarray with respect to the is-
sues over which the Court granted certiorari.203 
The probability is remote, however, that a renewal of cir-
cuit riding would cause the Court to suddenly face a large num-
 
 199. A closely related issue is whether the members of an appellate panel 
would be more deferential to the views of a sitting Supreme Court Justice, giv-
ing the circuit riding Justice too much influence over the decisions reached by 
the panel. See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 306 (2006) (discussing small group theory, in which “status 
in the group matters to decisionmaking and that ‘the individual who feels in-
ferior and needs approval will, in the group context, behave in a conforming 
manner’” (quoting S. SIDNEY ULMER, COURTS AS SMALL AND NOT SO SMALL 
GROUPS 13 (1971))). It is unclear, however, how the presence of a Supreme 
Court Justice would affect the behavioral dynamics of an appellate panel be-
cause, in the usual circumstance, a judge sitting by designation on a court of 
appeals is either from an equivalent or lower level of the federal judicial hier-
archy. See id. at 306–07. 
 200. See Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney General to the House 
of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLA-
NEOUS 23 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834). 
 201. Although the decisions of the Justices on recusal issues were far from 
uniform under the old circuit riding system, many did eventually recuse them-
selves from consideration of cases that they heard before the circuit courts. See 
Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1416 n.97. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall 
recused himself from the Court’s consideration of Stuart v. Laird for that very 
reason. Id.; see also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803). 
 202. See, e.g., Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 
99 (2002); Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. v. Felzen, 525 U.S. 315 (1999). 
 203. See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an 
Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 82–83 (2005). 
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ber of cases in which the outcome would be decided by an 
equally divided Court. As an initial matter, the courts of ap-
peals have terminated on the merits between 27,000 and 
30,000 cases during each year between 2000 and 2005.204 Many 
of those cases were undoubtedly decided by screening panels or 
some other similar mechanism. However, over the past six 
years, the number of cases receiving an oral argument before 
the courts of appeals (excluding the Federal Circuit) has ranged 
from a low of 8645 cases in 2004 to 9752 cases in 2000.205 Of 
those cases, the Supreme Court grants plenary consideration to 
about seventy-six to eighty cases per year, or roughly 0.9% of 
the cases receiving a full hearing before the courts of ap-
peals.206 If the Justices ride circuit for one week each year, they 
will in total have participated in approximately 225 lower court 
decisions, assuming that each panel hears about five cases per 
day.207 That figure is so small that it is unlikely that more than 
a handful of cases raising recusal questions will appear on the 
Court’s plenary docket each Term.208 Of that handful of cases, 
an even smaller percentage would result in an equally divided 
Court.209 As Ryan Black and Lee Epstein have observed, 
“equally divided cases are relatively rare occurrences.”210 Of the 
1,319 cases in which an equally divided court was a possibility 
during the 1946 to 2003 Terms, the Court was deadlocked in 
 
 204. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, http://www 
.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
 205. See id. 
 206. The Supreme Court issued an average of eighty “opinions of the court” 
between 2001 and 2005. These statistics were obtained from the Harvard Law 
Review’s annual “The Statistics” section. See The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
372, 380 (2006). 
 207. Most, if not all, of the circuits assign the cases heard by panels in a 
random fashion. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Agree to Disagree, WASH. MONTHLY, 
Sept. 2003, at 56, 57; Dov B. Fischer, Short-Circuiting Justice, WKLY. STAN-
DARD, May 27, 2002, at 15, 16. Accordingly, the cases heard by the Justices are 
unlikely to be either more difficult or have greater saliency (except by random 
chance) than those heard by other panels of a circuit. 
 208. In fact, assuming a 0.9% rate of plenary review by the Supreme Court 
for cases receiving a full hearing before the courts of appeals, approximately 
two additional Supreme Court cases per Term (or 0.9% multiplied by 225 
cases) would involve a recusal issue. 
 209. Based on the historical numbers calculated by Black and Epstein, the 
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 can be expected to produce an additional case in-
volving an equally divided Court about once every seven years. See Black & 
Epstein, supra note 203, at 86–94. 
 210. Id. at 85. Black and Epstein also found that the data “run contrary to 
[the] common belief” that discretionary recusals “lead to an appreciable in-
crease in . . . plurality opinions.” Id. at 94. 
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only seventy-four cases, or in about six percent of the cases in 
which a tie was possible.211 Based on these statistics, it appears 
unlikely that the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would result in a 
materially greater number of cases in which the outcome of a 
case would be decided by an equally divided Court. 
Skeptics may further argue that the advantages of the Cir-
cuit Riding Act of 2007 are largely illusory because all of the 
current Justices previously served on a U.S. court of appeals.212 
Indeed, in light of the failed nomination of Harriet Miers in 
2005, it appears that prior circuit court experience is an in-
creasingly important, perhaps even essential, credential for 
Supreme Court nominees.213 But prior judicial experience by no 
means eliminates the need for circuit riding. To the contrary, 
each of the Justices would benefit from regular exposure to dif-
ferent courts and judges, as well as to the types of cases com-
monly heard by the courts of appeals—call it continuing legal 
education (CLE) for Supreme Court Justices.214 As stated 
above, the Supreme Court’s plenary docket is highly limited, in 
terms of both the number and types of cases, and does not in-
clude cases involving highly factbound issues, pure questions of 
state law, or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, all of 
 
 211. Id. at 85–86. As the authors point out, the percentages were slightly 
higher for the Rehnquist Court, in which the Court deadlocked in about 8.11% 
of the cases in which a tie was possible. Id. at 86. 
Although they do not answer the question, Epstein and Black float a 
number of possible reasons for the surprisingly low number of cases decided by 
an equally divided Court. One possibility is that one or more Justices may 
change their votes for institutional reasons so as to avoid the negative conse-
quences flowing from a decision made by an equally divided Court. See id. at 
96. Another possibility is purely strategic: a Justice might “cast a ‘sophisti-
cated’ vote (in an apparent four-to-four case) to avoid a future decision that 
may be even more distant from her policy preferences,” as questions left unde-
cided by an evenly divided Court increase the temptation in the next case to 
renew the battle all over again. Id. It is also possible that the Justices refuse 
to recuse themselves in cases in which they think a split Court might result. 
See id. 
 212. See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2007). 
 213. See INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 5, 2007, at A2; Politics This Week, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 85. 
 214. Unlike for other active federal judges, there appears to be no statutory 
authorization for the Chief Justice to designate active Supreme Court Justices 
to sit by designation on the lower federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) 
(circuit judges); 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2000) (district judges); 28 U.S.C. § 294 (2000) 
(retired Supreme Court Justices, circuit judges, and district judges). 
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which are staples on the dockets of the lower federal courts.215 
And, of course, the current Justices, nearly all of whom have 
not sat by designation on a lower federal court, have not grap-
pled with the application of binding Supreme Court opinions in 
cases that they themselves had a hand in crafting. Further-
more, three of the Justices, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Souter, and Justice Thomas, enjoyed tenures on the courts of 
appeals of less than three years, while two others, Justice Ste-
vens and Justice Scalia, have not sat on a lower federal court in 
more than twenty years.216 Those five, because of their abbre-
viated or dated service to the circuit courts, would likely gain 
the most from circuit riding. 
Still others may argue that increasing the Supreme Court’s 
plenary docket is a more pressing workload concern. As I have 
noted previously, the Supreme Court’s plenary docket has de-
clined sharply over the past two decades, from a high of 153 
signed opinions in 1986 to just seventy-four signed opinions in 
both the 2002 and 2003 Terms.217 I agree that the Supreme 
Court should hear additional cases, and I propose elsewhere a 
certification procedure that is aimed at accomplishing that ob-
jective.218 But many of the benefits of circuit riding are exclu-
sive. For example, it is unlikely that increasing the size of the 
Supreme Court’s plenary docket would result in the Justices 
hearing a greater number of cases involving state law or the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and it certainly would not provide them 
with greater exposure to other judges, courts, and communi-
ties.219 Moreover, with at least four law clerks allotted to every 
Justice and the presence of numerous support staff at the Su-
preme Court, there is no reason to believe that Justices cannot 
handle both a larger plenary docket and the limited, additional 
circuit duties proposed in the Circuit Riding Act of 2007.220 
 
 215. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text. 
 216. See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 212. 
 217. See Stras, supra note 133, at 21–22. 
 218. See David R. Stras, Opening the Doors to the Supreme Court: A Solu-
tion to the Declining Plenary Docket (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). 
 219. See supra Part II.A. 
 220. It can be argued that the workload of today’s Supreme Court is much 
lighter than during the middle to end of the nineteenth century. During the 
1850s, the Court issued an average of 86.1 signed opinions per Term, slightly 
larger than the output of the current Court, and that number nearly quadru-
pled to an average of 265.7 signed opinions per Term in the 1880s. See EP-
STEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3. Moreover, until the 1880s, none 
of the Justices had law clerks, and the Justices regularly rode circuit for sev-
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A closely related objection is that a renewal of circuit rid-
ing could exact non-trivial opportunity costs on the Justices, in-
cluding interfering with their ability to complete their obliga-
tions to the Supreme Court. Perhaps circuit riding would also 
limit the other public appearances of the Justices, such as visits 
to law schools to give speeches or to judge moot court competi-
tions. If the Justices were currently spending their summers 
laboring over the Court’s business or visiting law schools, then 
this objection would hold substantial weight. However, as 
Calabresi and Presser point out, some Justices like Anthony 
Kennedy “spend their summers abroad in Europe,”221 while 
others such as John Paul Stevens have “plenty of time to en-
gage in leisurely activities” during the summer months.222 Even 
then-attorney and now-Chief Justice John Roberts has weighed 
in on the matter, stating in a memorandum that “it is true that 
only Supreme Court Justices and schoolchildren are expected 
to and do take the entire summer off.”223 
While the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would require Jus-
tices to spend only a single week in residence with the courts of 
appeals, it is true that their responsibilities under the Act could 
span a longer period. The Justices would presumably wish to 
review the briefs prior to oral argument (although the level of 
preparation would vary by Justice), and the completion of opin-
ion assignments from each sitting would require substantial 
additional work. But the burdens for the Justices in carrying 
out the duties required by the Act are related—even neces-
sary—to reaping the advantages from circuit riding discussed 
in Part II.A, such as having the Justices grapple with unfamil-
iar legal issues and interact with new sets of judges with differ-
ing viewpoints and experiences.224 Even so, it is difficult to 
imagine that the duties required by the Circuit Riding Act of 
 
eral months each year under difficult conditions. See Stras, supra note 133, at 
950–51. Even with the massive increase in the number of petitions for certio-
rari in recent years, it would be difficult to say that today’s Justices work 
harder than the Justices who served during the last half of the nineteenth 
century. 
 221. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1387. 
 222. See id. at 1414. 
 223. Jesse J. Holland, Roberts: Use Care with Religion, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Aug. 20, 2005, at A17, available at 2005 WLNR 13109076. 
 224. See supra notes 138–55 and accompanying text. Moreover, the amount 
of work for each of the Justices would depend in large part on the amount of 
work each delegates to her clerks, which varies widely by chambers. See Stras, 
supra note 133, at 6, 17–18. 
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2007 would eliminate more than half of the Justices’ lengthy 
summer vacations, and often much less, leaving them ample 
time for their other leisurely pursuits. 
Finally, although not technically a policy objection, skep-
tics may argue that passage of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is 
unrealistic because there is no movement afoot to reform the 
Supreme Court. An excellent example of this difficulty is the 
history of circuit riding itself, because it took nearly 120 years, 
numerous proposals from Congress, and constant complaints 
from the Justices to abolish it. Although the legal academy has 
become increasingly interested in exploring institutional re-
form of the Supreme Court, as reflected by two prominent aca-
demic conferences over the past two years,225 I am presently 
unaware of any proposals in Congress advocating major insti-
tutional change. It is unlikely that any members of Congress 
were elected solely on promises to reform the Supreme Court, 
or that such reform is high on their list of legislative goals. 
Nonetheless, a renewal of circuit riding is a far less objection-
able reform measure than other recent proposals that have re-
ceived extensive media coverage, such as a constitutional 
amendment proposing term limits for Supreme Court Jus-
tices226 and wide-reaching jurisdiction-stripping legislation.227 
 
 225. Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton sponsored a confer-
ence at Duke University Law School in 2005 that resulted in a collection of es-
says published by Carolina Academic Press. REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cram-
ton eds., 2005). In addition, the Minnesota Law Review sponsored a sympo-
sium in October 2005 entitled, “The Future of the Supreme Court: Institu-
tional Reform and Beyond,” in which ten leading scholars discussed the 
prospects for institutional reform of the Supreme Court. See David R. Stras & 
Karla Vehrs, Foreword: The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform 
and Beyond, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1148–53 (2006). 
 226. See, e.g., Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2006, at 
29; Fred Graham, In Need of Review: Life Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2006, at 11A; Linda Greenhouse, How Long is Too Long 
for the Court’s Justices?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 45. 
 227. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1416 (“Reinstituting circuit 
riding is far less controversial than passing jurisdiction-stripping bills . . . .”); 
Butch Mabin, Ginsburg: Federal Judiciary’s Historic Role Under Siege, LIN-
COLN J. STAR, Apr. 8, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 6166709 (quoting 
Justice Ginsburg as saying that jurisdiction-stripping bills have failed because 
“[i]t is easier to block enactment of a bill than to get a bill enacted”); Rule of 
Law in U.S. Requires an Independent Judiciary, TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), 
Oct. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 170002395 (“Bills have been filed in 
Congress involving ‘jurisdiction stripping’ on other subjects—for instance, 
eliminating the court’s ability to rule on such issues as the wording of the 
Pledge of Allegiance or the public display of the Ten Commandments.”). 
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With the academy’s recent interest in the Supreme Court as an 
institution, it is my hope that a greater number of proposals for 
institutional change will be generated, and that pressure will 
mount to have a real debate in Congress about the future of the 
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. 
  CONCLUSION   
Circuit riding for Supreme Court Justices is as old as the 
federal judiciary itself and has a storied history that spans this 
country’s first 120 years. Yet little academic commentary exists 
on it, and only one other scholarly piece has explored its re-
newal. With the size of the Supreme Court’s plenary docket fal-
ling in recent years to levels not seen since the mid-1800s, it is 
time to consider the reintroduction of circuit riding. As this Ar-
ticle suggests, there are numerous benefits to the general pub-
lic, the Court, and particularly the Justices that would result 
from a renewal of circuit riding. Moreover, these benefits can be 
attained in a reasonable and workable manner. Many of the 
policy objections that prompted circuit riding’s abolition are no 
longer concerns for today’s Court, and a proposal that requires 
Justices to perform work on the U.S. courts of appeals matches 
the competencies of both the Justices and the courts on which 
they would sit. In a time when the Court as an institution has 
become increasingly cloistered in Washington, D.C., a renewal 
of circuit riding would reverse that trend by exposing the Jus-
tices to a number of other judges, communities, and areas of 
the law. 
